War Beneath the Sea: Could Iran Disrupt Gulf Internet Cables and the Digital Economy?

Euro Times 25 October 2026, 02:31

صورة توضيحية للمياه البحرية، وليست للكابلات نفسها

A new front in the confrontation with Iran is emerging beneath the Gulf's waters. While oil tankers, ports and military bases remain visible points of vulnerability, submarine

EURO TIMES / Political Editor

In-depth analysis | October 25, 2026

A new front in the confrontation with Iran is emerging beneath the Gulf’s waters. While oil tankers, ports and military bases remain visible points of vulnerability, submarine communications cables are attracting attention as potential targets whose disruption could affect banks, cloud services and businesses far beyond the immediate conflict zone.

On October 23, Reuters reported, citing two senior Iranian security officials, that Tehran had developed detailed plans to strike undersea communications cables in the Gulf should US and Israeli attacks resume. One official suggested that delaying repairs could prolong disruption. This was an attributed account of contingency planning, not independently verified evidence that an operation had been ordered or carried out.

Why would submarine cables matter?

Subsea fiber-optic systems connect data centers, mobile networks, financial institutions and international internet exchanges. They carry transactions and communications on which modern services depend. Disruption can force operators to reroute data, increase latency and reduce available capacity. The impact is most serious where connections depend on a limited number of routes or landing stations.

Yet the claim that cutting cables around Hormuz could switch off the global internet is misleading. Reuters reported that less than one percent of international bandwidth passes through the strait, even though submarine cables as a whole carry the overwhelming majority of intercontinental data. The distinction is essential: individual Gulf networks could face severe disruptions without the entire global system collapsing.

Economic pressure rather than military victory

The most consequential effect might be uncertainty. Banks would need to activate backup links; technology companies could shift traffic to distant facilities; service providers might pay more for emergency capacity. Even temporary interruptions can affect confidence in regional digital infrastructure projects.

Reuters also described Iranian threats involving data centers and other infrastructure linked to US companies and Gulf investments. A threat, however, does not establish that a facility has been attacked. Its political purpose may be to broaden the set of stakeholders who fear further escalation: Gulf governments, global technology companies and financial institutions.

Where are the vulnerabilities?

Cable resilience varies considerably. Networks with several independent routes can often redirect traffic. Those dependent on a few landing points are more vulnerable, especially if multiple cables fail simultaneously. The precise consequence depends on redundancy, spare capacity and the time required to repair a break, not simply the number of cables on a map.

Repair is a particular concern during conflict. Specialist ships may require permits, safe access, equipment and insurance coverage. An extended security crisis could delay repairs even after the initial damage ends. This makes the duration of an interruption as important as its immediate severity.

The Red Sea must also be distinguished from the Strait of Hormuz: its communications corridors are of greater significance for Europe–Asia traffic. Combining threats in different waters into a single claim about an imminent global shutdown would distort the evidence.

Can Gulf states absorb the shock?

Practical resilience measures include geographically diverse cable routes, terrestrial links, multiple internet exchange points, redundant data-center connections and rigorous business-continuity testing. Local data storage can keep certain services operating during international outages. Satellite communication may provide useful emergency connectivity but cannot replace the capacity and economics of the full fiber-optic network.

Protection and repair also require regional coordination. Submarine infrastructure crosses national jurisdictions, and commercial operators need reliable channels to exchange warnings and obtain access for repairs. Intentionally attacking civilian infrastructure raises serious legal questions under international humanitarian law, depending on the circumstances, its use and the proportionality of any operation.

What should journalists and policymakers watch?

The strongest indicators would be operator notices, verified capacity losses, rerouting announcements, restrictions on repair vessels and documented changes in service quality. A cable fault does not automatically prove sabotage: accidental damage is common enough to require careful technical investigation before attribution.

The underlying strategic question is whether Iranian threats can increase the economic cost of renewed military action without provoking responses that undermine Tehran’s own interests. The answer depends less on dramatic claims about “switching off the internet” than on real network redundancy, the duration of any conflict and independently verified evidence of disruption.