By Dr. Ali Aljabiri
Editor-in-Chief, Euro Times
What appears to be a decision by U.S. President Donald Trump to impose a maritime blockade on Iran is far more than a conventional pressure tactic. If fully enforced, it carries the potential to trigger a sweeping economic shock — one that could unfold with near-immediate effect.
Iran’s economic structure remains heavily dependent on maritime routes. In 2025, the country’s total foreign trade reached approximately $109.7 billion, including $58 billion in imports and $51.6 billion in non-oil exports. In practical terms, this translates to roughly $159 million in daily imports and $141 million in daily non-oil exports moving through these sea lanes.
From a logistical perspective, Iranian ports handled around 234.8 million tons of cargo in the fiscal year ending March 2025 — a figure that underscores their central role in sustaining the national economy. The Imam Khomeini Port alone processed over 14 million tons of imports in just nine months, valued at more than $6 billion, including over $5.3 billion in essential goods. Any large-scale maritime disruption would therefore place immediate pressure on food security and critical supply chains.
But the core of the crisis lies in oil.
Estimates suggest that Iran has been exporting between 1.1 and 1.5 million barrels per day in recent months, with roughly 90% of these exports flowing through Kharg Island — the country’s primary energy chokepoint. Under a comprehensive blockade, the issue is no longer partial disruption, but near-total cessation. This places between $110 million and $170 million in daily oil revenues directly at risk.
When these figures are combined, the projected daily losses move beyond theoretical modeling into harsh economic reality, ranging between $410 million and $470 million per day — with the potential to reach the upper bound, or exceed it, should all alternative routes be effectively neutralized.
Under normal circumstances, Jask Port on the Gulf of Oman is often cited as a strategic workaround to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, alongside Chabahar Port, which provides limited access outside the Gulf.
However, if the blockade extends to these ports, that assumption collapses entirely. What were once partial alternatives become incapacitated assets within the blockade’s scope. At that point, the issue is no longer insufficient alternatives — but their effective absence. Iran would, in practical terms, lose the ability to circumvent the maritime chokehold.
The consequences extend far beyond trade and energy. Disruptions to imports would exert immediate pressure on food supply and industrial production, at a time when the Iranian rial is already under severe strain, having fallen to approximately 1.5 million per dollar. As foreign currency inflows shrink, inflationary pressures intensify, and purchasing power erodes at an accelerating pace.
Then comes the most critical factor: time.
With exports halted and production continuing, storage facilities would come under increasing strain. In the absence of any viable export outlet, the window before Iran is forced to scale down production — or shut in oil wells altogether — would rapidly narrow. Such measures could carry long-term consequences for the country’s production capacity.
At this stage, the blockade ceases to be a trade disruption and becomes a structural economic crisis.
The conclusion is difficult to ignore: Iran is not merely facing financial losses, but the prospect of near-total economic isolation from the global trading system.
And in such a scenario, the central question is no longer how much Iran stands to lose — but how long it can endure.
